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Mentalizing, the ability to attribute mental states to others and oneself, is a cognitive
function with high relevance for social interactions. Recent neuroscientific research
has increasingly contributed to attempts to decompose this complex social cognitive
function into constituting neurocognitive building blocks. Additionally, clinical research
that focuses on social cognition to find links between impaired social functioning and
neurophysiological deviations has accumulated evidence that mentalizing is affected in
most psychiatric disorders. Recently, both lines of research have started to employ
transcranial magnetic stimulation: the first to modulate mentalizing in order to specify its
neurocognitive components, the latter to treat impaired mentalizing in clinical conditions.
This review integrates findings of these two different approaches to draw a more
detailed picture of the neurocognitive basis of mentalizing and its deviations in psychiatric
disorders. Moreover, we evaluate the effectiveness of hitherto employed stimulation
techniques and protocols, paradigms and outcome measures. Based on this overview
we highlight new directions for future research on the neurocognitive basis of functional
and dysfunctional social cognition.
Keywords: transcranial magnetic stimulation, social cognition, mentalizing, theory of mind, autism spectrum
disorders, major depressive disorder, psychiatric disorders
INTRODUCTION
In the middle of the night your neighbor is desperately trying
to open your door with his key. Why is he doing that and how
will you react? Knowing that he just came back from a birth-
day party and being aware of his drinking habits, you are able
to infer that he probably falsely believes it is his door he is trying
to open. Instead of calling the police you might then help him to
find his own apartment. This example illustrates how our ability
to understand other people’s behavior by attributingmental states
like beliefs, desires or intentions, also known as Theory of Mind
(ToM) reasoning or mentalizing, drives social interactions.
A fast growing body of evidence suggests that mentalizing is
affected in most psychiatric disorders, including but not limited
to major depressive disorder (MDD; see Schreiter et al., 2013),
bipolar disorder (Bora et al., 2005; Van Rheenen and Rossell,
2013), social anxiety (Ribeiro and Fearon, 2010; Samson et al.,
2012), borderline personality disorder (Ghiassi et al., 2010; Mier
et al., 2013), eating disorders (Schulte-Rüther et al., 2012) and
neurodegenerative diseases (Le Bouc et al., 2012; Poletti et al.,
2012). Moreover, it has long been hypothesized that social cogni-
tive deficits in autism spectrum disorders (ASD) and schizophre-
nia result from impaired mentalizing (Brüne and Brüne-Cohrs,
2006; Frith, 2012).
However, this research is still in an early stage. Inconclusive
findings (e.g., Arntz et al., 2009; Schreiter et al., 2013) and a het-
erogeneous conceptualization of impaired social cognition do not
yet allow for drawing firm conclusions about the role of impaired
mentalizing in psychiatric disorders. To resolve this ambiguity,
it has been suggested to focus on the neurocognitive building
blocks of mentalizing in order to find links between symptomatic
impairment of social interactions and neurophysiological devia-
tions in psychiatric disorders (Frith, 2012; Kennedy and Adolphs,
2012; Happé and Frith, 2014).
Recently, cognitive neuroscientists started to specify these neu-
rocognitive building blocks of mentalizing using transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS, Hetu et al., 2012). A coil, placed on
the skull over the brain area of interest, produces a focal mag-
netic field which passes through the skull largely undistorted
and induces neuronal depolarization in superficial cortical areas.
When TMS is applied over specific brain regions in the context
of a cognitive task, the interference with behavioral performance
enables the study of causal relations between brain activity, cogni-
tive processes, and behavior (Walsh and Cowey, 2000; Robertson
et al., 2003; Paus, 2005).
TMS studies on mentalizing almost exclusively use repetitive
TMS (rTMS), which is why the current review focuses on this
method. A detailed description of recent technical and method-
ological issues for the application of various TMS protocols in the
study of cognition is provided elsewhere (Sandrini et al., 2011).
Applying rTMS has both an immediate interrupting effect on
neuronal processing in the stimulated area, and a modulatory
after-effect, which outlasts the stimulation period by minutes to
hours (cf., Eisenegger et al., 2008). The direction of this after-
effect (inhibitory/excitatory) depends on stimulation parameters
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and baseline activity of the stimulated area. Accordingly, rTMS
can be applied during the performance of a cognitive task (online)
or before task performance (offline). A third possibility is the
application of single pulses which interrupt neuronal activity for
a short but well-defined period, useful for identifying temporal
characteristics of neurocognitive processes.
Parallel to TMS research on functional mentalizing, clinical
research began to employ TMS to treat impaired mentalizing in
psychiatric disorders. For this purpose, repeated sessions of rTMS
have been applied over periods of several weeks for the treatment
of mentalizing deficits in ASD and MDD (Enticott et al., 2011,
2014; Berlim et al., 2012).
Here, we integrate and evaluate findings of these separately
emerging lines of research to show how TMS can advance our
understanding of the neurocognitive basis of mentalizing and
its impairment in clinical conditions, specifically in ASD and
MDD. Further, Table 1 provides methodological details of hith-
erto available brain stimulation studies on mentalizing. We sug-
gest that TMS combined with sensitive experimental paradigms is
a promising method to specify the neurocognitive architecture of
functional and dysfunctional mentalizing, which can be the key
to elucidate impaired social functioning in psychiatric disorders.
WHAT TMS REVEALS ABOUT MENTALIZING
THE NEUROCOGNITIVE BASIS OF MENTALIZING
Based on a large corpus of findings about the neurophysio-
logical basis of mentalizing (e.g., Van Overwalle, 2009; Mar,
2011), neuroscientific methods are increasingly employed to
test specific hypotheses about the neurocognitive processes that
constitute mentalizing. Here, we focus on brain regions that
appear to be central for mentalizing and have been targeted
in TMS studies thus far, namely the temporoparietal junction
(TPJ), the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the inferior
frontal gyrus (IFG), and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC;
Figure 1).
Right TPJ and mental models of self and other
Consistently observed in neuroimaging studies on mentalizing,
but little understood, is functional activity of the right TPJ
(RTPJ)1. Costa et al. (2008) were the first to show that stimula-
tion of the RTPJ interferes withmentalizing. Applying 1Hz-rTMS
impaired subjects’ performance in a false belief task (questions on
stories describing false beliefs about an object’s location) and in a
Faux Pas Test (questions on stories describing protagonists’ men-
tal states that led to awkward behavior). Consistently, Giardina
et al. (2011) and Young et al. (2010) found that 1Hz (/10Hz-
online)-rTMS over the RTPJ influenced the use of mental states
in reasoning about ethical or unethical behavior of others.
Crucially, TMS can not only tell us that the RTPJ is involved in
mentalizing, it also advances our understanding of its underlying
function. As outlined below, recent TMS studies provide converg-
ing evidence for the idea that RTPJ’s function in mentalizing is
1Also the left TPJ is involved in mentalizing (e.g., Samson et al., 2004; Schurz
et al., 2014). However, because recent theoretical discussions focus on the
RTPJ and the TMS studies reviewed here also predominantly targeted the
RTPJ, we concentrate on this region in the current article.
to handle internal models of one’s own and other’s mental states
and their relation to the environment (Decety and Sommerville,
2003).
Several lines of evidence from neuroimaging and brain stim-
ulation in single cases suggested that the RTPJ integrates mul-
tisensory input with internally stored information to form a
first-person perspective, i.e., a coherent sense of one’s own body
situated in and distinguishable from the rest of the world (cf.,
Blanke et al., 2005; De Ridder et al., 2007; Ionta et al., 2011). This
notion has been supported by a study in which RTPJ activity has
been disrupted by single-pulse TMS during the rubber hand illu-
sion, resulting in an impaired ability to distinguish between self-
relevant (“this is part of my body”) and self-irrelevant (“this is not
part of my body”) sensory information (Tsakiris et al., 2008). It
was concluded that the RTPJ maintains an internal model of one’s
own body as a reference for self-relevance evaluations of incoming
sensory information.
Heinisch et al. (2011; cf., Heinisch et al., 2012) provided evi-
dence that the RTPJ is also involved in distinguishing self-relevant
from other-relevant information. In this study subjects were pre-
sented with a picture of another person’s face that morphed
gradually into a picture of their own face or vice versa. The par-
ticipants indicated the moment they recognized their own face,
and the moment they were sure that they were seeing the face
of another person, respectively. The application of 1Hz-rTMS
over the RTPJ biased this self-other discrimination toward self-
face recognition at the expense of other-face recognition. Further
evidence comes from a control-of-imitation task, in which the
participants moved a finger either congruently or incongruently
to a simultaneously observed finger movement of another person.
The ability to control the tendency to imitate the other’s move-
ment was impaired by 10-Hz-online-rTMS (Sowden and Catmur,
2013)2 .
In sum, these findings confirm the role of the RTPJ in men-
talizing and specify that the RTPJ is critically relevant for simul-
taneously maintaining mental models of the self and others
and their relation to the environment (“how do I perceive the
world vs. how does the other perceive the world?”). This may be
achieved by integrating sensory information from the environ-
ment with internally stored information (Cabeza et al., 2012) and
with expectations and predictions about self and other (Koster-
Hale and Saxe, 2013). By this we are able to flexibly switch
between perspectives, depending on what is required in a certain
situation.
2A similar effect was previously shown by Santiesteban et al. (2012) using the
same task but a different stimulation method, namely transcranial direct cur-
rent stimulation. Intriguingly, anodal tDCS (which increases cortical excitabil-
ity) enhanced the ability to control imitation. Moreover, Santiesteban and
colleagues showed that anodal tDCS not only facilitated the self at the expense
of the other, but also vice versa. In another task, anodal stimulation facili-
tated the subjects’ ability to inhibit their own perspective in order to adopt the
perspective of another person. We point at this finding because of its high the-
oretical relevance. However, it is difficult to directly compare tDCS and rTMS
findings as those two methods substantially differ. We refrain from a detailed
discussion of this tDCS study as this falls beyond the scope of this review. For
a general overview of both noninvasive brain stimulationmethods seeWagner
et al. (2007).
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic overview of brain regions that have been targeted
by non-invasive brain stimulation to study functional and dysfunctional
mentalizing. Color labels are approximate. (A) Sagittal view of the brain
showing the posterior medial prefrontal cortex (pMPFC, indicated in
light-blue) and the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC, in green). (B)
Lateral view of the left (L) hemisphere of the brain. Colored regions display
the left inferior frontal gyrus (IFG; in dark-blue), the left dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex (DLPFC; in yellow), and the left temporoparietal junction (LTPJ; in
purple). (C) Lateral view of the right (R) hemisphere: the right DLPFC is
displayed in yellow, the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ) in purple.
DLPFC, IFG, and perspective inhibition
Evidence on the role of the DLPFC in mentalizing is still too
sparse to draw firm conclusions about its neurocognitive role in
mentalizing (cf., Costa et al., 2008; Kalbe et al., 2010). Further,
only little TMS research has focused on the more ventral IFG,
a region with much larger evidence on its involvement in men-
talizing (Mar, 2011). It has been proposed that the IFG’s role
in mentalizing is perspective inhibition (Ruby and Decety, 2004;
Ramsey et al., 2013). For example, when adopting another’s per-
spective, one’s own perspective has to be inhibited and vice versa.
While the RTPJ maintains mental models of one’s own and
another’s perspective, the IFG inhibits one of these models during
perspective selection. To our knowledge only one study investi-
gated the effect of rTMS over the left IFG (Keuken et al., 2011).
In this study a relatively short 1Hz-rTMS of 5min had no effect
on subsequent performance in two standard mentalizing tasks as
compared to control stimulation. More studies employing well-
suited tasks and stimulation protocols are required to test the
IFG’s causal role in mentalizing.
MPFC and decoupling
It was proposed that theMPFC’s role in mentalizing is to subserve
the decoupling mechanism, i.e., processing another’s perspective
independently from one’s own view on the world (Leslie, 1987,
1994; Frith and Frith, 2003; Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Döhnel
et al., 2012). Recent neuroimaging findings showed that during
the computation of one’s own and another’s perspective, the pos-
terior MPFC (pMPFC) is involved in establishing a perspective
difference through inhibitory influence on temporoparietal brain
regions (Schuwerk et al., 2014a). It seems that while the RTPJ
maintains mental models of self and other by integrating internal
(memory-based/predicted) and external (sensory) information,
inhibitory influence of the pMPFC suppresses processing of exter-
nal information to enable the decoupled computation of one’s
own and another’s perspective. Consistent with this idea, inhibit-
ing the pMPFC by 1Hz-rTMS with a double-cone coil impaired
the participant’s ability to distinguish between one’s own and
another’s perspective in a false belief task (Schuwerk et al., 2014b).
In another study, 1Hz-stimulation of the pMPFC with so-called
“deep rTMS” modulated affective ToM performance in depen-
dence of baseline empathic abilities (Krause et al., 2012). Taken
together, these findings indicate that the pMPFC can be targeted
by specific rTMS techniques and encourage future rTMS research
focusing on that area.
TMS TO STUDY AND TREAT DYSFUNCTIONAL MENTALIZING?
Recently, researchers began to test the therapeutic use of high-
frequency rTMS on dysfunctional mentalizing in ASD and MDD.
However, little is known about specifically impaired underlying
neurocognitive mechanisms: ASD is characterized by widespread
structural and functional brain abnormalities (Philip et al., 2012;
Mueller et al., 2013). Among these, a reduced functional con-
nectivity between the MPFC and RTPJ during mentalizing has
been observed in individuals with ASD (Castelli et al., 2002;
Kana et al., 2009). It can be hypothesized that the decoupled
processing of one’s own and another’s perspective, mediated by
inhibitory influence of the pMPFC to the temporoparietal cortex,
is impaired in ASD. This is supported by the specific difficulty to
attribute false beliefs to other people (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985;
Senju et al., 2009), and close to the early hypothesis that a “fail-
ure of decoupling” underlies ASD (Leslie, 1987). If this were the
case, could high-frequency stimulation of the pMPFC alleviate
this mentalizing deficit?
In a double-blind randomized sham-controlled trial, Enticott
et al. (2014) tested if high-frequency rTMS over the pMPFC
improves impaired social functioning in ASD. Participants with
high-functioning autism and Asperger’s syndrome received 5Hz-
rTMS of the pMPFC on consecutive days over about 2 weeks.
After active treatment as compared to sham treatment, patients
reported reduced social relating impairments and anxiety in
social situations (Enticott et al., 2014), as well as improved social
functioning, including an increased capacity for perspective tak-
ing and empathy (Enticott et al., 2011).
Taken together, this fits with the hypothesis that the mentaliz-
ing deficit in ASD is related to impaired inhibitory influence of the
pMPFC on the RTPJ. However, to provide direct evidence for this
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idea, future TMS studies have to show that (1) high-frequency
TMS increases the connectivity between the pMPFC and RTPJ
during mentalizing and (2) improves the ability to establish a
perspective difference in a sensitive experimental task.
Clinical research indicates that amentalizing deficit also plays a
role in MDD (Schreiter et al., 2013). Compared to non-depressed
controls, individuals with a current depressive episode showed
a weaker performance in decoding mental states from facial
expressions (Lee et al., 2005). Patients with a currently remitted
MDD were impaired in a second-order false belief task (inferring
thoughts about thoughts; Inoue et al., 2004) and had a higher
risk for relapse 1 year later (Inoue et al., 2006). Also mentalizing-
associated brain regions show abnormal functional activity and
connectivity in depression (Aan Het Rot et al., 2009; Price and
Drevets, 2012).
Is the neurocognitive basis of mentalizing affected in MDD? A
prominent symptom of depressed patients is a high self-focus, i.e.,
a high attentional focus on oneself compared to others (e.g., Flory
et al., 2000). An impaired ability to efficiently switch between
one’s own and another’s perspective might be one contributing
factor to this predominant self-focus. One’s own negatively biased
perspective constitutes the reference-point not only in judgments
of one’s own current and future situation, but also affects how one
perceives the rest of the world (cf. the negative triad; Beck, 1972).
Presently, this idea remains speculative. Although a large body
of evidence suggests that rTMS of the DLPFC has an antidepres-
sant effect (Lefaucheur et al., 2014), we currently lack evidence
on possible links between impaired neurocognitive components
of mentalizing and depressive symptoms. To our knowledge, only
one study has addressed this issue and found a relation between
10Hz-rTMS to the left DLPFC, improved performance in a ToM
task, and the alleviation of depressive symptoms (Berlim et al.,
2012). However, these preliminary findings do not allow for firm
conclusions about causal associations of these factors.
In sum, TMS seems to be a valuable tool in the investigation of
the relationship between impaired mentalizing, its neuronal cor-
relates, and related psychiatric disorders. At the same time it is
definitely premature to claim that TMS constitutes a therapeutic
strategy to improve impairedmentalizing. But in the light of accu-
mulating evidence that brain stimulation may enhance (1) cog-
nitive functioning in psychiatric disorders (Demirtas-Tatlidede
et al., 2013) and (2) mentalizing in healthy subjects (Santiesteban
et al., 2012), it can be regarded as a promising method to tackle
dysfunctional mentalizing.
EFFECTIVENESS OF EMPLOYED STIMULATION METHODS
All previously reported stimulation techniques (online and offline
rTMS, single-pulse TMS), brain site localization procedures, and
most stimulation protocols produced effects of interest (Table 1).
Unfortunately, only half of the TMS studies on mentalizing
reviewed here reported effect sizes. In these studies the effect sizes
are medium to large. To improve the evaluation of observed find-
ings and facilitate the design of future studies, comprehensive
descriptions of all methodological aspects and detailed reporting
of results, including effect sizes, are highly desirable.
A critical issue appears to be the employment of sensitive
experimental paradigms. Particularly, adaptations of traditional
ToM tests, such as the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2001), ToM cartoons (Brunet et al., 2000) or social
animations (e.g., Abell et al., 2000), produced heterogeneous
results. Several authors stated that their employed tasks might not
be sensitive enough to measure TMS-induced effects on behav-
ioral outcome measures (e.g., Krause et al., 2012; Enticott et al.,
2014; c.f., Keuken et al., 2011; Lev-Ran et al., 2012). Future
studies must carefully design paradigms that allow for detecting
TMS effects on reaction times and accuracy rates, the two most
prominent outcome measures.
The development of sensitive mentalizing tasks for TMS
research will also be critical for the evaluation of rTMS as a
therapeutic approach for dysfunctional mentalizing. In a review
on the role of social cognition in MDD, Schreiter et al. (2013)
pointed out that especially objective measures, i.e., laboratory
tasks, seem to be more reliable and sensitive than self-reports, for
example.
FUTURE DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
To date, available TMS studies on mentalizing show that the
RTPJ, DLPFC, and MPFC, identified by previous neuroimaging
research on ToM, are causally involved in mentalizing. Given the
correlational nature of functional magnetic resonance imaging or
electroencephalography, this is a critical finding that adds to neu-
ropsychological evidence on the causal role of those brain regions
in ToM (e.g., Samson and Michel, 2013). Further, TMS is par-
ticularly suited to specify the neurocognitive building blocks of
mentalizing, a current issue in ToM research. A major challenge
for future research will be to develop sensitive paradigms to detect
TMS-induced effects on mentalizing.
Future research should focus on the connectivity between
mentalizing-associated brain regions. Both brain functions and
stimulation effects are not restricted to specific regions, but have
to be conceptualized as network effects. Only if we understand the
brain as a network can we learn more about how the interplay of
its regions underpins functional and dysfunctional social cogni-
tion (e.g., Kennedy and Adolphs, 2012). Although a set of brain
regions which were linked to mentalizing by previous research is
labeled “ToM network,” little is known about the critical inter-
actions of those regions. One avenue for future research will
be the simultaneous stimulation of several brain regions associ-
ated with mentalizing while another approach is the combination
of brain stimulation and neuroimaging for the assessment of
stimulation-induced network effects.
Claiming that TMS can be used as a therapeutic intervention
for dysfunctional mentalizing is clearly premature. But, prelim-
inary evidence for its influence on mentalizing in ASD and
MDD promises that TMS, combined with sensitive paradigms,
will provide insights into the dysfunction of the neurocognitive
basis of mentalizing in clinical conditions. In the future, it may
be possible to combine TMS with psychotherapeutic interven-
tions in order to tackle impaired social cognition in psychiatric
disorders.
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